How Does Blast Work?

L2|Risk C|7 mechanisms|6 interactions

An Ethereum Layer 2 network that automatically earns yield on your ETH and stablecoins by staking them behind the scenes. It holds about $200M in deposits and raised $27M in funding. Its C- grade reflects serious concerns: anonymous wallet signers control all deposited money, and there is no working system to catch fraudulent transactions.

TVL

$76M

Sector

L2

Risk Grade

C

Value Grade

C-

Core Mechanisms

Yield/Native-Rebasing

Novel

Auto-rebasing ETH that automatically accrues ~4% beacon chain staking yield for all EOAs

ETH balances automatically increase via rebasing on yield distribution events. Unique among L2s. Fundamentally changes EVM balance semantics and breaks assumptions in many standard contracts.

Yield/Stablecoin-Rebasing

Novel

USDB auto-rebasing stablecoin backed by MakerDAO T-Bill yield

Stablecoins on Blast automatically accrue yield from RWA protocols (MakerDAO DSR). Changes stablecoin semantics from static to dynamic balance model.

Rollup/Optimistic

Optimistic rollup without functional fraud proof system

Standard optimistic rollup architecture but proof system is not fully functional. State validation relies entirely on centralized proposer honesty. Significant trust assumption.

Governance/Multisig

3-of-5 multisig with anonymous signers controlling protocol upgrades and deposits

All deposited assets controlled by 3/5 multisig. No public information on signer identities. 4 of 5 signer wallets funded from the same source address, suggesting possible single-entity control.

Yield/Staking-Backend

Novel

ETH yield sourced from Lido staking deployed by the bridge contract

Bridge contract deposits user ETH into Lido for staking yield, then distributes yield back via rebasing. Adds Lido dependency and smart contract risk to L2 bridge.

Airdrop/Points

Points-based incentive system for TVL attraction and user acquisition

Points system incentivized early deposits. Created mercenary capital dynamics with TVL flowing in for airdrop and potentially flowing out post-distribution.

Token/L2-Gas

Novel

BLAST token for governance and gas rebates to dApp developers

Novel gas revenue sharing where dApps earn gas fees from their users' transactions. Changes developer incentive model but creates dependency on BLAST token value.

How the Pieces Interact

3/5 anonymous multisigETH bridge depositsCritical

Anonymous multisig controlling all bridged assets with 4/5 signers funded from same wallet means 3 compromised keys (potentially held by one entity) could drain all user deposits.

No functional proof systemOptimistic rollup state finalizationCritical

Without working fraud proofs, a malicious proposer can finalize invalid state transitions. Users have no on-chain recourse to challenge incorrect state, risking total loss of bridged funds.

Auto-rebasing ETHDeFi smart contracts on BlastHigh

Rebasing ETH breaks standard EVM assumptions where balances are static between transactions. Contracts not designed for rebasing can lose yield or miscalculate user balances.

Lido staking backendETH yield distribution via rebasingHigh

Dependency on Lido for yield generation means a Lido exploit or slashing event would reduce or eliminate the native yield proposition, undermining Blast's core value proposition.

USDB rebasing stablecoinDeFi protocol integrationsMedium

Protocols integrating USDB must handle rebasing logic correctly. Accounting errors in vaults, lending, or DEXs using USDB could create extractable discrepancies.

What Could Go Wrong

  1. 3/5 multisig with unknown signers (4 of 5 funded by same wallet) controlling all deposited assets raises custodial risk
  2. Native yield auto-rebasing changes ETH balance semantics, breaking smart contract assumptions across the ecosystem
  3. No functional proof system means a malicious proposer can finalize invalid state and cause loss of funds

Anonymous Multisig Key Compromise

Elevated

Trigger: 3 of 5 multisig keys (potentially held by a single entity given 4/5 funded from same wallet) are compromised or coerced, enabling unauthorized withdrawal of all bridged assets

  1. 1.Attacker gains control of 3 multisig keys through social engineering, phishing, or single-entity compromise Full control over Blast bridge contract holding all deposited ETH and stablecoins
  2. 2.Attacker initiates withdrawal of ETH from Lido staking positions held by the bridge Lido unstaking queue delays mean attacker drains liquid assets first, then queues staked ETH
  3. 3.Bridge drain detected by monitoring tools; users attempt emergency exits No functional fraud proof system means users have zero on-chain recourse to challenge the withdrawal
  4. 4.Auto-rebasing ETH on Blast becomes unbacked as underlying assets are drained All ETH balances on Blast become worthless tokens with no backing
  5. 5.USDB loses peg as MakerDAO T-Bill yield backing is severed Complete ecosystem collapse; all DeFi protocols on Blast face simultaneous insolvency

Risk Profile at a Glance

Mechanism Novelty3/15
Interaction Severity10/20
Oracle Surface0/10
Documentation Gaps7/10
Track Record10/15
Scale Exposure3/10
Regulatory Risk2/10
Vitality Risk9/10
C

Overall: C (44/100)

Lower score = safer

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