HR20 Index
Risk ratings for the 20 largest protocols by total value locked.
HR20 Moversvs 2026-09-07
Combined TVL
$172.4B
Avg Risk Score
37/100
A-B Grades
11
D-F Grades
0
| # | Protocol | TVL | Grade | Score | Top Risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | EthereumL1 | $37.7B | A- | 13 | Staking centralization — top entities including Lido (~25%) and major CEXs collectively control >60% of staked ETH; below the 33% single-entity censorship threshold but the concentration creates cartelization and correlated-failure risk |
| 2 | LidoLiquid Staking | $17.8B | B | 24 | ~23% of all staked ETH controlled by one protocol creates Ethereum-level systemic centralization risk; market share has declined from a 2023 peak of ~32%, reducing proximity to the 33% consensus interference threshold |
| 3 | Aave V3Lending | $13.9B | C | 49 | Accepted stolen rsETH as e-mode collateral on April 18, 2026 after Kelp DAO's LayerZero bridge was exploited for $292M; attacker borrowed WETH against now-worthless collateral, leaving Aave V3 with $177-200M in bad debt. WETH pool hit 100% utilization, $6.2B in withdrawals, AAVE -17.7%. Recovery plan: a DeFi United coalition (Consensys, Lido, EtherFi, others) pledged $300M+ and published a technical proposal on April 28 to restore full rsETH backing without socializing losses; governance votes across Ethereum and Arbitrum deployments are pending as of April 30. Umbrella holds ~23,500 WETH (~$54M), covering ~60% of L1 Core losses; outstanding deficit contingent on vote outcome. |
| 4 | SSV NetworkLiquid Staking | $9.4B | B | 27 | DVT splits validator keys across 4+ operators via Shamir Secret Sharing — a compromised threshold (3-of-4) of operators could forge attestations or double-sign, risking slashing of the 7.4M+ ETH secured by SSV (~118,000 validators). |
| 5 | Morpho BlueLending | $7.8B | C | 47 | Oracle-agnostic permissionless markets: any oracle can be used in any market, including low-quality or malicious ones; the October 2024 PAXG exploit ($230K) confirmed oracle misconfiguration is the primary attack vector |
| 6 | MorphoLending | $7.6B | B- | 30 | P2P matching engine adds complexity: if matching fails, fallback to pool rates may surprise users |
| 7 | WBTC (Wrapped Bitcoin)Bridge | $7.4B | C | 50 | Custodial 2-of-3 key concentration in Justin Sun entities: BiT Global (Justin Sun-affiliated, HK) now holds two of the three keys in WBTC's custody vault arrangement — the user key (Hong Kong) and backup key (Singapore) — while BitGo retains one key and provides infrastructure. A BiT Global insolvency, regulatory seizure, or governance dispute could impair the 1:1 BTC backing on ~$7.4B of circulating WBTC. BitGo's OCC bank charter and Fortune 500 status (NYSE: BTGO) provide a strong institutional backstop on the BitGo side. |
| 8 | Binance Staked ETHLiquid Staking | $7.1B | B- | 35 | Centralized custody: all staked ETH is managed by Binance validators, creating a single-entity dependency for ~$7.4B in assets |
| 9 | LayerZeroBridge | $6.7B | C- | 53 | Infrastructure compromise confirmed: the April 2026 KelpDAO exploit ($292M) demonstrated that social engineering of LayerZero developers combined with DDoS-forced RPC failover can bypass DVN verification for single-verifier (1-of-1) applications. LayerZero admitted fault on May 9, 2026; $2B+ in TVL migrated to competing solutions. |
| 10 | SolanaL1 | $6.2B | B- | 35 | Network reliability — history of extended outages requiring validator coordination to restart |
| 11 | MakerDAOCDP | $6.2B | B | 26 | Oracle-dependent liquidation system: Maker relies on a custom oracle module (Medianizer/OSM with 1-hour delay) feeding ETH and other collateral prices. During Black Thursday (March 2020), oracle lag combined with network congestion led to $8.3M in zero-bid liquidation auctions. The system has since been rebuilt with Liquidations 2.0 (Dutch auction format) and Chainlink integration, substantially mitigating but not eliminating oracle-related liquidation risk. |
| 12 | Sky LendingCDP | $5.7B | C- | 53 | Extremely thin capital buffer: S&P rated the protocol B- citing a 0.4% capital ratio — any significant bad-debt event could threaten solvency |
| 13 | SkyCDP | $5.7B | B- | 30 | USDS freeze function introduces censorship risk that undermines decentralization, splitting the community between DAI purists and USDS adopters |
| 14 | HyperliquidDerivatives | $5.2B | C- | 55 | CME Group and ICE formally lobbied CFTC (May 2026) to mandate Hyperliquid register as a derivatives exchange with KYC and trade surveillance; the platform was also used as a laundering passthrough in the May 2026 THORChain exploit, reinforcing the sanctions evasion narrative regulators have advanced |
| 15 | BNB ChainL1 | $5.2B | C+ | 38 | Centralization — only 21 cabinet validators produce blocks (45 total including candidates), all effectively controlled by Binance ecosystem |
| 16 | EigenLayerRestaking | $5.1B | B- | 34 | EigenLayer introduced restaking as a novel mechanism category where staked ETH simultaneously secures multiple Actively Validated Services (AVSs), creating correlated slashing risk — an operator slashed on one AVS could trigger cascading unstaking across other AVSs they secure, though the April 2025 slashing upgrade introduced unique allocated stake per AVS to contain blast radius. |
| 17 | TronL1 | $5.1B | B | 27 | Rainberry Inc. (Tron-associated) settled SEC charges for $10M in March 2026 with all claims dismissed with prejudice, removing the primary regulatory overhang. Justin Sun's dual federal litigation — suing WLFI for fraud (alleging governance manipulation over his $107M position) while being counter-sued by WLFI for defamation and market manipulation — both cases active in U.S. federal court as of July 2026, introducing fresh reputational and legal risk tied to the key person. |
| 18 | EigenCloudRestaking | $5.1B | C+ | 40 | Protocol generates minimal organic revenue — the $541K/month ($6.5M/year) in real fees is dwarfed by ~$12M/year in EIGEN emissions; ELIP-012 (approved March 2026) routes real fees to buyback but net dilution continues as emissions exceed revenue |
| 19 | EthenaStablecoin | $3.8B | C | 47 | Reserve fund ($62M) covers ~1.4% of $4.4B USDe supply — depletes in ~52 days under the protocol's own V1 stress test at -10% annualized funding (coverage ratio thinned further as supply recovered from the $3.8B trough to a May 2026 high near $5.4B, only to contract again as funding rates compressed) |
| 20 | SparkLendLending | $3.7B | B- | 30 | Sky ecosystem concentration: SparkLend is deeply coupled to MakerDAO/Sky governance and the USDS/DAI stablecoin. SparkLend's liquidity backbone (the Spark Liquidity Layer) is Sky-controlled — a governance crisis or DAI instability would directly impair SparkLend's lending capacity. |
Ranked by TVL. Lower risk score = safer. Read our methodology →