| 1 | | B+ | A- | L1 | $46.1B | Regulatory risk — potential for future unfavorable classification by major regulators | → 0 |
| 2 | | B | B | Liquid Staking | $18.7B | 28%+ of all staked ETH controlled by one protocol creates Ethereum-level systemic centralization risk | ▲ 1 |
| 3 | | B | C+ | Liquid Staking | $14.7B | DVT splits validator keys across 4+ operators via Shamir Secret Sharing — a compromised threshold (3-of-4) of operators could forge attestations or double-sign, risking slashing of the 7.4M+ ETH secured by SSV (~118,000 validators). | ▲ 2 |
| 4 | | C- | B+ | Lending | $13.4B | Accepted stolen rsETH as e-mode collateral on April 18, 2026 after Kelp DAO's LayerZero bridge was exploited for $292M; attacker borrowed WETH against now-worthless collateral, leaving Aave V3 with $177-200M in bad debt. WETH pool hit 100% utilization, $6.2B in withdrawals, AAVE -17.7%. Recovery plan: a DeFi United coalition (Consensys, Lido, EtherFi, others) pledged $300M+ and published a technical proposal on April 28 to restore full rsETH backing without socializing losses; governance votes across Ethereum and Arbitrum deployments are pending as of April 30. Umbrella holds ~23,500 WETH (~$54M), covering ~60% of L1 Core losses; outstanding deficit contingent on vote outcome. | → 0 |
| 5 | | C | B | Bridge | $8.6B | Custodial dual-entity risk: WBTC relies on BitGo (now a federally OCC-chartered bank, NYSE-listed as BTGO since January 2026) and BiT Global (Justin Sun-affiliated, HK) as co-custodians holding ~118,000 BTC. While BitGo's federal charter significantly de-risks the primary custodian, a BiT Global insolvency, regulatory seizure, or governance dispute would impair the 1:1 backing. | → 0 |
| 6 | | C+ | D+ | Restaking | $8.6B | EigenLayer introduced restaking as a novel mechanism category where staked ETH simultaneously secures multiple Actively Validated Services (AVSs), creating correlated slashing risk — an operator slashed on one AVS could trigger cascading unstaking across other AVSs they secure, though the April 2025 slashing upgrade introduced unique allocated stake per AVS to contain blast radius. | ▲ 1 |
| 7 | | B- | C | Lending | $7.5B | P2P matching engine adds complexity: if matching fails, fallback to pool rates may surprise users | → 0 |
| 8 | | B- | D- | Liquid Staking | $7.4B | Centralized custody: all staked ETH is managed by Binance validators, creating a single-entity dependency for ~$7.7B in assets | ▼ 1 |
| 9 | | C+ | C+ | Restaking | $6.3B | Protocol generates minimal organic revenue — the $541K/month ($6.5M/year) in real fees is dwarfed by ~$12M/year in EIGEN emissions; ELIP-012 (approved March 2026) routes real fees to buyback but net dilution continues as emissions exceed revenue | ▲ 1 |
| 10 | | C+ | B- | L1 | $6.2B | Network reliability — history of extended outages requiring validator coordination to restart | ▲ 2 |
| 11 | | B- | B | CDP | $5.7B | Oracle-dependent liquidation system: Maker relies on a custom oracle module (Medianizer/OSM with 1-hour delay) feeding ETH and other collateral prices. During Black Thursday (March 2020), oracle lag combined with network congestion led to $8.3M in zero-bid liquidation auctions. The system has since been rebuilt with Liquidations 2.0 (Dutch auction format) and Chainlink integration, substantially mitigating but not eliminating oracle-related liquidation risk. | → 0 |
| 12 | | B- | A- | CDP | $5.7B | USDS freeze function introduces censorship risk that undermines decentralization, splitting the community between DAI purists and USDS adopters | → 0 |
| 13 | | C- | B+ | CDP | $5.7B | Extremely thin capital buffer: S&P rated the protocol B- citing a 0.4% capital ratio — any significant bad-debt event could threaten solvency | — |
| 14 | | C- | B- | Derivatives | $5.2B | Custom L1 with limited validator set creates centralization and censorship risk; team demonstrated unilateral intervention capability during the JELLY delisting | ▲ 4 |
| 15 | | B- | C+ | L1 | $5.1B | Rainberry Inc. (Tron-associated) settled SEC charges for $10M in March 2026 with all claims dismissed with prejudice, removing the primary regulatory overhang. Justin Sun's ongoing wash-trading controversy and a May 2026 defamation lawsuit against WLFI (following Sun's fraud suit alleging governance manipulation over his $107M WLFI position) introduce fresh reputational and legal risk tied to the key person. | → 0 |
| 16 | | C+ | C+ | L1 | $5.0B | Centralization — only 21 cabinet validators produce blocks (45 total including candidates), all effectively controlled by Binance ecosystem | ▲ 2 |
| 17 | | C | B | Stablecoin | $4.3B | Reserve fund ($62M) covers ~1.4% of $4.4B USDe supply — depletes in ~52 days under the protocol's own V1 stress test at -10% annualized funding (coverage ratio thinned further as supply recovered from the $3.8B trough to a May 2026 high near $5.4B, only to contract again as funding rates compressed) | ▼ 1 |
| 18 | | C- | B- | Restaking | $3.8B | BLS vote extension vulnerability allows validators to bypass consensus by omitting block hash fields, undermining the security model at its core. | ▼ 1 |
| 19 | | C- | C | Restaking | $3.8B | Self-custodial BTC staking via EOTS is a novel cryptographic primitive with no battle-tested precedent — any flaw in slashing/extraction logic could irreversibly forfeit staked BTC | ▲ 2 |
| 20 | | C | B- | Liquid Staking | $3.7B | EigenLayer restaking slashing (conditional risk): eETH validators are set up for EigenLayer restaking, but ether.fi operators have not yet opted into slashing modules per Chaos Labs' governance analysis. When/if operators opt in, all eETH holders would share proportional losses from any AVS slashing event — the architecture supports socialized loss even though the risk is not yet active. | ▼ 2 |
| 21 | | B- | D | Lending | $3.6B | Heavy governance centralization under Justin Sun and TRON Foundation with no documented multisig; single-entity risk to $3.5B+ TVL | ▼ 2 |
| 22 | | C- | B- | Restaking | $3.4B | EigenLayer restaking with socialized slashing: all eETH holders share proportional losses if an AVS is slashed. EigenLayer's live slashing system (since April 2025) makes this an active risk — a major AVS incident could reduce eETH's value for all holders simultaneously. | ▲ 2 |
| 23 | | B- | B | Lending | $3.3B | Deep dependency on Sky (MakerDAO) ecosystem: protocol solvency is backstopped by Sky's $6.5B reserve, creating single-entity systemic risk | ▼ 3 |
| 24 | | B- | C- | Lending | $3.3B | Sky ecosystem concentration: SparkLend is deeply coupled to MakerDAO/Sky governance and the USDS/DAI stablecoin. SparkLend's liquidity backbone (the Spark Liquidity Layer) is Sky-controlled — a governance crisis or DAI instability would directly impair SparkLend's lending capacity. | — |
| 25 | | C+ | A- | RWA | $3.3B | Tether corporate contagion risk: despite separate legal structure, XAUt's association with Tether (USDT issuer) creates reputational and regulatory risk if parent company faces enforcement actions or banking failures | → 0 |
| 26 | | B | C- | L2 | $3.2B | The Security Council (9-of-12 multisig) can perform emergency upgrades to all Arbitrum contracts without any timelock delay, creating a centralization risk where a compromised or coerced council could alter the rollup's behavior instantly. The DAO has published the council member identities and an election process to mitigate this. In April 2026, the Security Council exercised this freeze power to lock $71M in ETH tied to the Kelp DAO exploit, demonstrating real-world use of this emergency authority. | ▲ 2 |
| 27 | | B- | C | RWA | $3.0B | Multi-chain bridge risk: BUIDL deploys across Ethereum, Solana, Polygon, BNB Chain, and Avalanche via Wormhole; a bridge exploit could mint unbacked tokens or freeze legitimate holders’ assets across chains | ▼ 3 |
| 28 | | B- | D | RWA | $3.0B | USYC is a permissioned, KYC-gated token representing the Hashnote International Short Duration Yield Fund. Regulatory changes to tokenized securities could force redemption freezes or operational changes, with $1.7B in assets at risk. | → 0 |
| 29 | | C+ | B+ | RWA | $2.9B | USYC is now a Circle product following the acquisition (completed 2025), materially improving regulatory standing and institutional credibility, but Circle's compliance-heavy model means potential regulatory constraints on USYC usage in certain jurisdictions. | ▲ 2 |
| 30 | | B- | C+ | L2 | $2.8B | Coinbase is sole sequencer with no permissionless fallback, creating a corporate single point of failure for $4.1B in TVL — though Stage 1 decentralization (Jan 2026) now allows users to exit without sequencer cooperation. | → 0 |
| 31 | | C+ | B+ | RWA | $2.7B | Counterparty risk on underlying custodians and fund managers — if short-term Treasury backing fails, USDY depegs | → 0 |
| 32 | | C- | C | Yield | $2.6B | New protocol with large TVL and limited track record: Grove Finance launched in June 2025 and has rapidly accumulated $2.7B TVL. No audits are publicly documented in DeFiLlama's data. A protocol of this size with less than one year of track record and unverified audit status represents meaningful smart contract risk. | — |
| 33 | | B- | C- | Yield | $2.3B | Capital deployed across multiple chains and DeFi protocols means a failure in ANY recipient protocol cascades losses back through the entire Spark/Sky ecosystem | ▼ 1 |
| 34 | | B+ | A- | RWA | $2.2B | BUSD wind-down precedent: Paxos was forced by NYDFS to cease BUSD operations in 2023, demonstrating that even federally chartered products can be shut down by regulators — a risk class that applies to PAXG. | → 0 |
| 35 | | B | C- | Yield | $2.1B | Spark Savings (sDAI/sUSDS) depends entirely on the Sky (formerly Maker) DSR/SSR rate, which is governance-controlled. Rate changes (e.g., the March 2025 cut from 6.5% to 4.5% and the April 2026 cut to ~3.65%) cause rapid TVL swings as yield-seekers migrate, creating reflexive inflow/outflow dynamics. | → 0 |
| 36 | | B- | B- | DeFi | $2.1B | Curator misallocation risk — Steakhouse controls allocation of $1.8B across lending markets, and a single bad market selection could cascade across all vaults | → 0 |
| 37 | | C+ | C- | Bridge | $2.0B | February 2022 exploit allowed minting 120,000 wETH ($320M) without collateral via signature verification bug; Jump Crypto backstopped losses | ▼ 2 |
| 38 | | C- | C | Lending | $2.0B | Core Foundation obtained a Cayman Islands court injunction (March 2026) blocking Maple from launching syrupBTC, alleging misuse of confidential information from their joint lstBTC development — this blocks a $150M+ institutional asset product and introduces legal/operational overhang. | ▲ 1 |
| 39 | | B | B- | DEX | $1.8B | Dominant BSC DEX position creates systemic concentration risk; BSC chain-level issues directly impact ~$1.7B TVL | ▲ 1 |
| 40 | | C+ | C- | DeFi | $1.8B | Smart Collateral and Smart Debt create reflexive leverage loops up to 39x theoretical max | ▲ 2 |
| 41 | | B+ | B+ | DEX | $1.7B | Concentrated liquidity amplifies impermanent loss when prices move out of LP-set ranges | → 0 |
| 42 | | B- | D+ | DeFi | $1.7B | Kraken DeFi Earn concentration: Kraken's integration as the primary TVL driver means a platform withdrawal or regulatory action affecting Kraken could force rapid liquidation of $500M+ in DeFi positions at distressed prices | → 0 |
| 43 | | B | B | DEX | $1.6B | Vyper compiler vulnerability (July 2023 exploit) eroded trust; language-level risks persist for Vyper-based contracts | ▲ 1 |
| 44 | | C | C+ | Stablecoin | $1.5B | Basis-trade yield strategy depends on persistent positive funding rates — prolonged negative funding can erode collateral backing | ▲ 1 |
| 45 | | D+ | D+ | Restaking | $1.5B | LBTC is a bridge-dependent wrapped BTC derivative — the KelpDAO April 2026 $292M LayerZero exploit directly templates the attack vector for LBTC (multi-chain OFT-style distribution, bridge config risk) | — |
| 46 | | B- | B+ | Yield | $1.4B | 70% TVL concentration in Ethena USDe creates existential dependency on a single yield source; a USDe depeg or yield collapse would directly impact most of Pendle's deposit base | ▲ 2 |
| 47 | | C+ | C+ | RWA | $1.4B | Real-world asset counterparty and default risk is inherently opaque on-chain; 2023 default event exposed originator vetting weaknesses | ▲ 3 |
| 48 | | C+ | C+ | DeFi | $1.4B | Gauntlet's simulation-based risk models curate $2B+ in vault AUM and inform parameters for protocols with $35B+ in monitored assets — models calibrated on historical data may fail catastrophically during tail events outside observed volatility ranges | ▲ 1 |
| 49 | | C+ | C- | Stablecoin | $1.4B | USDD relies on TRX as a primary reserve asset, creating correlated collateral risk — a severe TRX drawdown could impair the overcollateralization ratio below the 130% minimum despite the current 200%+ buffer. | ▼ 2 |
| 50 | | C+ | C- | RWA | $1.4B | February 2026 data breach compromised 967,000 user records via Okta SSO social engineering — no on-chain impact but elevates regulatory scrutiny and customer phishing exposure | ▼ 1 |
| 51 | | B- | C+ | Lending | $1.3B | Solana network risk concentration: Kamino Lend operates exclusively on Solana, which has experienced multiple network outages (2021-2023). A prolonged Solana outage during a market sell-off would prevent liquidations from occurring, allowing unhealthy positions to accumulate bad debt. | — |
| 52 | | C+ | C+ | Lending | $1.3B | Unified liquidity market allows risk spillover from one toxic asset to contaminate all lending positions | — |
| 53 | | D | D+ | Restaking | $1.3B | LayerZero bridge configuration allowed attacker to mint 116,500 rsETH (~$292M, 18% of supply) on April 18, 2026 with no corresponding ETH on source chain; largest DeFi exploit of 2026 | ▲ 20 |
| 54 | | B- | C+ | L1 | $1.2B | Bridge dependency — checkpoints to Ethereum create a trust assumption and potential attack vector; the PoS Bridge secures over $1B in locked assets with a validator multisig | → 0 |
| 55 | | B | C- | RWA | $1.2B | Spiko tokenizes money market funds backed by US and EU Treasury bills — while the underlying assets are low-risk, the tokenization layer introduces smart contract, custody, and regulatory surface area that traditional T-bill investors don't face. | ▼ 2 |
| 56 | | B- | B | Lending | $1.2B | 2024 governance attack extracted $24M COMP from treasury via coordinated whale voting (Proposal 247) | → 0 |
| 57 | | B- | D+ | Liquid Staking | $1.2B | Multi-LST Infinity pool aggregates risk from all supported LSTs; a single LST depeg can poison the entire pool through arbitrage-driven toxic asset accumulation | ▲ 3 |
| 58 | | C | C+ | RWA | $1.2B | Tokenized equities depend on off-chain broker-dealer custody via Ondo's in-house SEC-registered subsidiary (formerly Oasis Pro Markets, acquired Oct 2025) — regulatory enforcement against Ondo's integrated entity or SEC reporting failure could freeze all token redemptions | → 0 |
| 59 | | B | B | RWA | $1.1B | Over 90% of reserves held in a single asset (BlackRock BUIDL), creating concentration risk on one tokenized treasury fund; the May 2026 Basin liquidity facility provides $1B/day instant redemption capacity, significantly reducing gating scenarios but not eliminating single-asset concentration | ▼ 3 |
| 60 | | C | C+ | Lending | $1.1B | History of severe incidents: $200M+ XVS price manipulation cascade (2021), $100M+ bad debt from BNB bridge hack (2022), and a March 15, 2026 donation attack extracting $3.7M via supply cap manipulation (attacker accumulated 12.2M THE tokens over 9 months to bypass supply limits) | → 0 |
| 61 | | C+ | C | RWA | $1.0B | Franklin Templeton (transfer agent) retains unilateral power to freeze, clawback, and restrict BENJI token transfers on all nine blockchains — tokens are not censorship-resistant | ▲ 3 |
| 62 | | B | C+ | Yield | $1.0B | Vault curator model introduces principal-agent risk — curators allocate capital across DeFi strategies on behalf of depositors | ▼ 1 |
| 63 | | C+ | C+ | DEX | $1.0B | Admin key compromise led to $4.4M exploit in Dec 2022, exposing centralised control over pool parameters | ▼ 1 |
| 64 | | C+ | C | Liquid Staking | $1.0B | BTC custody risk: Lorenzo holds custodied Bitcoin on behalf of stakers — a custody provider failure or hack would result in permanent BTC loss for stakers | ▲ 8 |
| 65 | | B- | C- | Liquid Staking | $997M | Kinetiq holds 82.5% market share in Hyperliquid liquid staking, creating single-point-of-failure concentration risk for the entire Hyperliquid staking ecosystem. | ▼ 2 |
| 66 | | B- | D | RWA | $964M | BCAP is a tokenized venture capital fund where the underlying portfolio consists of illiquid blockchain startup investments. NAV is determined by periodic fund valuations rather than real-time market pricing, creating potential for stale or inaccurate pricing between valuation events. | ▲ 1 |
| 67 | | B- | C+ | Yield | $962M | Multi-strategy vaults deploy capital across Aave, Curve, Morpho, and EigenLayer simultaneously; hidden correlations between strategies mean diversification benefits evaporate during systemic DeFi stress events | ▼ 3 |
| 68 | | C+ | D- | Liquid Staking | $943M | Centralized custody: all staked SOL is managed by Binance validators, creating a single-entity dependency for ~$1.1B in assets | ▼ 2 |
| 69 | | B- | D- | RWA | $921M | Fully centralized operations — WisdomTree controls all minting, redemption, and transfer allowlisting with no on-chain governance | ▲ 2 |
| 70 | | C+ | B- | Lending | $921M | Rehypothecation in vaults creates cross-vault contagion risk despite initial 'zero contagion' marketing claims — Jupiter COO acknowledged in December 2025 that 'very limited' contagion risk exists | ▼ 1 |
| 71 | | B+ | B | DEX | $905M | Sandwich attacks exploit constant-product AMM with 90% of blocks vulnerable to front-running | → 0 |
| 72 | | B- | D | RWA | $864M | Anemoy relies on Chronicle Protocol's RWA Oracle for on-chain NAV reporting of its tokenized funds, creating a single oracle dependency for pricing accuracy across its $567M AUM. Chronicle's Proof of Asset framework provides cryptographic verification, but a sustained oracle failure could delay redemptions. | → 0 |
| 73 | | C+ | B- | Liquid Staking | $861M | Validator sandwich attacks extracted 30K-60K SOL/month despite bans — MEV redistribution incentivizes exploitation | ▲ 2 |
| 74 | | B- | B | Liquid Staking | $840M | 8 ETH minipool operators bear outsized slashing risk relative to their bond, with losses partially socialized to rETH holders | → 0 |
| 75 | | B | B- | Liquid Staking | $832M | jupSOL is delegated primarily to Jupiter's own validator running the experimental Frankendancer client, creating concentration and software risk | → 0 |
| 76 | | B- | C+ | Liquid Staking | $810M | Distributed key generation (DKG) ceremony is a trust-critical operation — a compromised or colluding majority of cluster nodes can reconstruct the full validator key | ▲ 2 |
| 77 | | B | B+ | Liquid Staking | $801M | JitoSOL's MEV tip distribution depends on >95% of Solana validators running the Jito client, creating systemic centralization risk for the network | ▼ 1 |
| 78 | | B- | C+ | DeFi | $795M | Chainlink Labs retains significant centralized control over network operations, including node operator selection and staking pool parameters, though the network has operated reliably for 7+ years under this model and a decentralization roadmap is in progress. | ▼ 1 |
| 79 | | C+ | C+ | Lending | $794M | Extreme gas optimization using inline assembly sacrifices code readability, complicating audits and obscuring potential attack paths | ▲ 2 |
| 80 | | B- | C | Liquid Staking | $765M | osETH overcollateralisation model means validators bear first-loss risk — slashing or poor performance directly erodes their position before osETH holders | ▲ 1 |
| 81 | | C+ | D+ | Liquid Staking | $737M | LBTC's 1:1 BTC backing depends entirely on Babylon's Bitcoin staking security; any slashing event or Babylon exploit directly depegs LBTC across all 15 integrated chains | ▼ 1 |
| 82 | | B- | C | Liquid Staking | $727M | Institutional node operator concentration (Coinbase, Kraken, Figment, Blockdaemon, Staked) creates correlated regulatory risk; SEC enforcement against any operator could cascade to validator shutdowns and LsETH yield failure | ▼ 1 |
| 83 | | B- | B | DEX | $726M | Permissionless hooks execute arbitrary code on every swap, enabling novel attack vectors with 36% of analyzed hooks found potentially vulnerable | ▲ 2 |
| 84 | | B | D- | RWA | $723M | Centralized mint/redeem gating via allowlist means Superstate (as digital transfer agent) can freeze or deny redemptions at will | ▼ 2 |
| 85 | | C | D+ | Restaking | $714M | LBTC depends on Babylon's nascent BTC staking infrastructure which has no proven slashing enforcement mechanism yet | → 0 |
| 86 | | C+ | C- | DeFi | $700M | CeDeFi hybrid model depends on centralized custody (CEFFU/Binance) remaining solvent and accessible; LCTs (Liquidity Custody Tokens) become worthless if CeFi custodian fails, combining centralized custody risk with decentralized protocol exposure | → 0 |
| 87 | | B- | C | L1 | $658M | Novel consensus — Snowball protocol is less battle-tested than traditional BFT or Nakamoto consensus | → 0 |
| 88 | | C | B | Derivatives | $639M | JLP holders are the counterparty to all perp traders — during trending markets, the pool can suffer significant directional losses | ▲ 1 |
| 89 | | B- | C | Lending | $615M | Extreme TVL growth (1,000% YTD to $4.5B across Lista DAO) means the lending markets are largely untested under sustained bearish conditions | → 0 |
| 90 | | C+ | C- | Lending | $615M | Systemic concentration risk: Lista DAO controls nearly 50% of BNB Chain's entire staking market with 12M+ BNB staked, creating a single point of failure for the chain's security and liquidity | ▲ 1 |
| 91 | | B- | C- | Liquid Staking | $591M | slisBNB commands ~50% of BNB Chain staking market share, creating unprecedented concentration risk for the chain's validator set and security model | — |
| 92 | | B- | C | Yield | $576M | Convex controls ~50% of veCRV voting power, creating systemic Curve governance centralization risk | → 0 |
| 93 | | C+ | C+ | L1 | $563M | Sui validators demonstrated the ability to freeze $162M in stolen funds within hours during the May 2025 Cetus exploit — a recovery success, but also proof that a coordinated supermajority of validators can censor arbitrary addresses, undermining the censorship-resistance claim. | → 0 |
| 94 | | D+ | D+ | L1 | $557M | Aster Chain launched mainnet in March 2026 with no public specification of its ZK proving system, VM architecture, or consensus mechanism, and no L1-specific audit has been completed. The $298M in TVL sits on unverified infrastructure — a critical bug in the ZK circuit could allow fraudulent state transitions that drain user funds without detection. | ▲ 2 |
| 95 | | B- | D- | Liquid Staking | $555M | dzSOL launched in January 2025, making it approximately one year old. Despite rapid growth to 13.2M SOL staked ($1.1B), the protocol has limited track record through different market conditions (no bear market test, no major stress event). Early-stage liquid staking tokens carry higher smart contract risk than established alternatives. | — |
| 96 | | C+ | D+ | L2 | $533M | Optimism's sequencer remains fully centralized, operated solely by OP Labs with no decentralized fallback or concrete timeline for decentralization. Multiple sequencer outages occurred in 2025 (August and November), confirming this as a live operational risk rather than a theoretical concern. During downtime, users cannot submit transactions and must wait ~12 hours to force-include via L1. | ▼ 1 |
| 97 | | C | D+ | RWA | $527M | Custodian failure or insolvency (InCore Bank, Maerki Baumann) would leave xStocks partially or fully unbacked — tokens could go to zero | — |
| 98 | | C | C+ | Yield | $500M | BTC delta-neutral strategy depends on perpetual funding rates being positive — in bear markets, negative funding drains yield and can erode principal | ▲ 8 |
| 99 | | C+ | C- | DeFi | $499M | Governance was compromised in May 2023 when an attacker used a malicious proposal with hidden SELFDESTRUCT/CREATE2 logic to grant themselves 1.2M votes, exceeding the legitimate 700K votes. The attacker later returned control, but the attack vector demonstrated that DAO proposal auditing is insufficient to prevent governance takeover. | — |
| 100 | | B | D | Lending | $477M | HyperLend is a friendly fork of Aave deployed on Hyperliquid's HyperEVM chain. While Aave's codebase is well-audited, HyperEVM is a newer L1 with limited battle-testing compared to Ethereum, introducing infrastructure risk beneath a proven lending protocol. | ▼ 2 |
