How Does Hashnote Work?
A tokenized US Treasury fund (USYC) that lets you earn government bond yields on-chain. It manages $500M and is the primary backing for Usual's USD0 stablecoin ($700M). Its C grade reflects the concentrated counterparty risk where Hashnote's failure would cascade through USD0 into broader DeFi.
TVL
$2.8B
Sector
RWA
Risk Grade
C+
Value Grade
B+
Core Mechanisms
RWA-Tokenization
USYC: yield-bearing ERC-20 token representing shares in Hashnote International Short Duration Yield Fund backed by US Treasury Bills
USYC is an appreciation-model token (value increases over time) representing ownership of short-term US Treasuries and repo activity. Standard RWA tokenization pattern following Franklin Templeton's BENJI and BlackRock's BUIDL. Earns Fed Funds rate.
3.5.1
Appreciation model: token value increases over time rather than distributing separate yield
Unlike dividend-paying tokens, USYC accrues value directly into token price. This simplifies accounting and tax treatment but makes yield less transparent. Each USYC token represents pro-rata share of growing Treasury fund.
Whitelist-Minting
Whitelisted institutional minting: only approved entities can mint USYC by depositing USD
Hashnote restricts minting to whitelisted partners like Usual protocol. This enables KYC/AML compliance but creates centralization and single-point-of-failure risk. Usual holds >$700M of USYC (~140% of total supply).
T1-Redemption
T+1 redemption process: USYC holders face one-day settlement delay when redeeming for USD
Since USYC is backed by physical US Treasuries with T+1 settlement, redemptions cannot be instant. This creates standard money-market fund liquidity risk where stress events cause redemption queues and price dislocations.
Custody-Chain
Multi-party custody: Hashnote uses third-party custodians for Treasury holdings, creating operational dependencies
Standard RWA pattern where on-chain token is legally backed by off-chain assets held by regulated custodians. Creates counterparty risk to custodian, fund administrator, and Hashnote entity itself.
How the Pieces Interact
Usual holds ~$700M USYC (>50% of its TVL) as primary backing for USD0. If USYC depegs or faces redemption delays, USD0 immediately loses 1:1 backing and depegs, potentially collapsing Usual protocol
During market stress, USYC holders rushing to redeem face T+1 settlement queue. Early redeemers get $1, but as queue grows, USYC trades at discount in secondary market, creating classic bank run incentive structure
USD0 is used as collateral across DeFi (Aave, Morpho, etc.). A USYC depeg causing USD0 depeg would trigger simultaneous liquidations across all protocols, creating billions in forced selling and bad debt
If SEC deems USYC an unregistered security, all tokens could be frozen and underlying Treasuries seized, making USYC worthless and collapsing Usual USD0 which depends on it
Hashnote can unilaterally block minting or redemption for any holder. If Hashnote freezes Usual's access (due to legal pressure or dispute), USD0 loses ability to maintain peg through arbitrage
What Could Go Wrong
- USYC is now a Circle product following the acquisition (completed 2025), materially improving regulatory standing and institutional credibility, but Circle's compliance-heavy model means potential regulatory constraints on USYC usage in certain jurisdictions.
- Institutional-only access (KYC/AML required for direct redemption) limits retail adoption and creates secondary market liquidity risk during stress events when institutional redemptions dominate.
- Smart contract risk from yield distribution and redemption mechanics; USYC's on-chain integration with DeFi protocols (e.g., Hyperliquid, exchange collateral) creates novel attack surfaces not present in traditional T-bill funds.
Treasury Depeg Cascades Through DeFi via Usual USD0
ModerateTrigger: Hashnote's USYC loses peg due to US Treasury default, regulatory action, or operational failure, triggering cascade through Usual's USD0 and broader DeFi collateral chains
- 1.Hashnote USYC depegs from $1 to $0.85 due to US Treasury payment delay, regulatory freeze of underlying assets, or operational breach in custody chain — Usual's USD0 stablecoin, backed primarily by USYC (~$700M), immediately trades below $1 as redemption arbitrage fails
- 2.DeFi protocols using USD0 as collateral (Aave, Morpho, etc.) trigger cascading liquidations as USD0 drops to $0.90 — Billions in leveraged positions unwind; borrowers face unexpected liquidations, lenders face bad debt as collateral value crashes
- 3.Market loses confidence in all RWA stablecoins; USYC holders rush to redeem, but Hashnote faces T+1 or T+2 settlement delays on underlying Treasuries — Redemption queue grows to weeks; USYC trades at increasing discount (potentially to $0.70), amplifying losses
- 4.Contagion spreads to other treasury-backed stablecoins (USDY, OUSG, BUIDL) as market questions entire RWA sector — RWA sector ($5B+ TVL) faces confidence crisis; institutional adoption narrative collapses, potentially setting back DeFi-TradFi integration by years
Risk Profile at a Glance
Overall: C+ (38/100)
Lower score = safer