How Does Belt Finance Work?

Yield|Risk C+|6 mechanisms|5 interactions

Belt Finance is a multi-strategy yield optimizer and stableswap AMM on BSC, Klaytn, and Heco that auto-compounds deposits across DeFi protocols. With $12M TVL, it suffered a major $50M exploit in 2021 but has since undergone V3 audit by DeDaub. Created by Ozys, a Klaytn Governance Council member.

TVL

$11M

Sector

Yield

Risk Grade

C+

Value Grade

D-

Core Mechanisms

4.1.3 Stableswap (Curve-style)

StableSwap AMM for low-slippage stablecoin swaps

Curve-style stableswap

2.2.4 Split model (% to each destination)

Novel

Multi-strategy vaults auto-shifting across yield sources with compounding

Dynamic multi-strategy rebalancing

7.1.1 Fixed reward per block/epoch

BELT farming rewards

Standard liquidity mining

2.1.2 Percentage-based fee

Swap and vault performance fees

Standard fees

8.1.3 Message-passing bridges

Cross-chain via Orbit Bridge (BSC to Heco) and Klaytn

Bridge dependency

5.4.1 Multisig override

Team-managed strategy selection by Ozys

Centralized management

How the Pieces Interact

Multi-strategy vaults↔Underlying protocol riskHigh

Exploit in any underlying protocol cascades to Belt depositors — demonstrated in 2021

Flash loan accessibility↔Vault share pricingHigh

Flash loans can manipulate vault share pricing — exact vector of 2021 $50M exploit

StableSwap AMM↔Stablecoin depegMedium

Pool imbalance and LP losses if one stablecoin depegs

Cross-chain deployment↔Bridge dependencyMedium

Bridge compromise affects cross-chain BELT holders

Auto-compounding↔Gas costsLow

Compounding efficiency drops on congested networks

What Could Go Wrong

  1. Suffered $50M flash loan exploit in May 2021 — major security failure history
  2. Multi-strategy yield vaults create complex dependency chains across protocols
  3. Cross-chain deployment (BSC, Klaytn, Heco) multiplies attack surface
  4. StableSwap pools concentrate risk in stablecoin depeg scenarios

Repeat Flash Loan Exploit

Moderate

Trigger: New vulnerability in V3 vault logic exploited via flash loans

  1. 1.Flash loan manipulates vault share pricing — Attacker extracts excess funds
  2. 2.Remaining shares diluted — Depositors face losses
  3. 3.Protocol pauses — Users locked out
  4. 4.Mass exit post-exploit — TVL collapses

Risk Profile at a Glance

Mechanism Novelty3/15
Interaction Severity6/20
Oracle Surface2/10
Documentation Gaps4/10
Track Record15/15
Scale Exposure3/10
Regulatory Risk3/10
Vitality Risk6/10
C+

Overall: C+ (42/100)

Lower score = safer

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