How Does Belt Finance Work?
Belt Finance is a multi-strategy yield optimizer and stableswap AMM on BSC, Klaytn, and Heco that auto-compounds deposits across DeFi protocols. With $12M TVL, it suffered a major $50M exploit in 2021 but has since undergone V3 audit by DeDaub. Created by Ozys, a Klaytn Governance Council member.
TVL
$13M
Sector
Yield
Risk Grade
C+
Value Grade
D-
Core Mechanisms
4.1.3 Stableswap (Curve-style)
StableSwap AMM for low-slippage stablecoin swaps
Curve-style stableswap
2.2.4 Split model (% to each destination)
NovelMulti-strategy vaults auto-shifting across yield sources with compounding
Dynamic multi-strategy rebalancing
7.1.1 Fixed reward per block/epoch
BELT farming rewards
Standard liquidity mining
2.1.2 Percentage-based fee
Swap and vault performance fees
Standard fees
8.1.3 Message-passing bridges
Cross-chain via Orbit Bridge (BSC to Heco) and Klaytn
Bridge dependency
5.4.1 Multisig override
Team-managed strategy selection by Ozys
Centralized management
How the Pieces Interact
Exploit in any underlying protocol cascades to Belt depositors — demonstrated in 2021
Flash loans can manipulate vault share pricing — exact vector of 2021 $50M exploit
Pool imbalance and LP losses if one stablecoin depegs
Bridge compromise affects cross-chain BELT holders
Compounding efficiency drops on congested networks
What Could Go Wrong
- Suffered $50M flash loan exploit in May 2021 — major security failure history
- Multi-strategy yield vaults create complex dependency chains across protocols
- Cross-chain deployment (BSC, Klaytn, Heco) multiplies attack surface
- StableSwap pools concentrate risk in stablecoin depeg scenarios
Repeat Flash Loan Exploit
ModerateTrigger: New vulnerability in V3 vault logic exploited via flash loans
- 1.Flash loan manipulates vault share pricing — Attacker extracts excess funds
- 2.Remaining shares diluted — Depositors face losses
- 3.Protocol pauses — Users locked out
- 4.Mass exit post-exploit — TVL collapses
Risk Profile at a Glance
Overall: C+ (42/100)
Lower score = safer