How Does Belt Finance Work?

Yield|Risk C+|6 mechanisms|5 interactions

Belt Finance is a multi-strategy yield optimizer and stableswap AMM on BSC, Klaytn, and Heco that auto-compounds deposits across DeFi protocols. With $12M TVL, it suffered a major $50M exploit in 2021 but has since undergone V3 audit by DeDaub. Created by Ozys, a Klaytn Governance Council member.

TVL

$13M

Sector

Yield

Risk Grade

C+

Value Grade

D-

Core Mechanisms

4.1.3 Stableswap (Curve-style)

StableSwap AMM for low-slippage stablecoin swaps

Curve-style stableswap

2.2.4 Split model (% to each destination)

Novel

Multi-strategy vaults auto-shifting across yield sources with compounding

Dynamic multi-strategy rebalancing

7.1.1 Fixed reward per block/epoch

BELT farming rewards

Standard liquidity mining

2.1.2 Percentage-based fee

Swap and vault performance fees

Standard fees

8.1.3 Message-passing bridges

Cross-chain via Orbit Bridge (BSC to Heco) and Klaytn

Bridge dependency

5.4.1 Multisig override

Team-managed strategy selection by Ozys

Centralized management

How the Pieces Interact

Multi-strategy vaultsUnderlying protocol riskHigh

Exploit in any underlying protocol cascades to Belt depositors — demonstrated in 2021

Flash loan accessibilityVault share pricingHigh

Flash loans can manipulate vault share pricing — exact vector of 2021 $50M exploit

StableSwap AMMStablecoin depegMedium

Pool imbalance and LP losses if one stablecoin depegs

Cross-chain deploymentBridge dependencyMedium

Bridge compromise affects cross-chain BELT holders

Auto-compoundingGas costsLow

Compounding efficiency drops on congested networks

What Could Go Wrong

  1. Suffered $50M flash loan exploit in May 2021 — major security failure history
  2. Multi-strategy yield vaults create complex dependency chains across protocols
  3. Cross-chain deployment (BSC, Klaytn, Heco) multiplies attack surface
  4. StableSwap pools concentrate risk in stablecoin depeg scenarios

Repeat Flash Loan Exploit

Moderate

Trigger: New vulnerability in V3 vault logic exploited via flash loans

  1. 1.Flash loan manipulates vault share pricing Attacker extracts excess funds
  2. 2.Remaining shares diluted Depositors face losses
  3. 3.Protocol pauses Users locked out
  4. 4.Mass exit post-exploit TVL collapses

Risk Profile at a Glance

Mechanism Novelty3/15
Interaction Severity6/20
Oracle Surface2/10
Documentation Gaps4/10
Track Record15/15
Scale Exposure3/10
Regulatory Risk3/10
Vitality Risk6/10
C+

Overall: C+ (42/100)

Lower score = safer

More on Belt Finance

Related Yield Explainers